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Abstract: This paper theoretically and empirically examines the impact of self-managed
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lead to a decrease of effort due to a loss of control. Based on German individual-level panel data,
we find that SMWT employees exert higher effort levels than employees with fixed working
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21 Introduction
According to the social psychology literature, delegating authority to workers benefits
employers, because authorised workers are highly motivated by feeling committed to their
employers, leading to intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000) and reciprocal behaviour
(Blau, 1964; Homans, 1958). In other words, received autonomy is likely to interact with the two
personality traits intrinsic motivation and reciprocity. Recent work in behavioural economic
theory yields similar results (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008; Dur et al., 2010). The economic
literature, however, emphasises the following trade-off for employers when delegating authority
to their workers (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Aghion et al., 2013; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011):
On the one hand, increased motivation associated with higher worker authority may raise
performance. On the other hand, workers can abuse their authority and this can reduce
performance.
In our paper, we address this trade-off by focusing on one key component of delegated
authority – workers’ autonomy over their working time. In particular, we are interested in
working time arrangements that allow workers to control the starting and finishing times of their
workday, to set their breaks, vacation days and days off, and to freely distribute their workdays
over the working week. Many of these regimes additionally include the decision right upon the
place of work and thus allow working from home, at least occasionally (Kelly and Moen, 2007;
Nijp et al., 2012; Shockley and Allen, 2012). We refer to such arrangements as self-managed
working time (SMWT).
A natural consequence of SMWT is that employers no longer need to record actual working
hours. While the omission of working hours registration enables the employer to save monitoring
costs, it also harms his opportunities to control the workers’ effort. This implies that the
employer relies on his workers to abstain from exploiting their time sovereignty opportunistically
by reducing effort.1 SMWT is a widespread phenomenon. In the United States about 15% of
employees are able to completely determine working hours on their own (Golden, 2012), while
the corresponding percentage is about 17% for EU27 employees (Goudswaard et al., 2012). Yet,
a theoretical analysis of SMWT does not exist and empirical evidence on the effects of this type
1 Probably, this is why SMWT is sometimes also called trust-based working time (e.g., Singe and Croucher, 2003;
Godart et al., 2016). Other expressions used in the literature include work time control, schedule control, trust hours,
or boundary-less work (Beckers et al., 2012; Kelly and Moen, 2007).
3of autonomy on worker performance is still scarce. As we document below, existing studies in
this area typically analyse particular firms or occupations, or provide experimental evidence.
In the present paper, we study the effect of working time autonomy on worker performance
in a closely linked theoretical and empirical analysis. We also analyse how a worker’s
personality interacts with SMWT, focussing on two personality traits that boost individual
performance according to social psychology. In the theoretical analysis, we develop a modified
moral-hazard model, which includes intrinsic motivation, reciprocal behaviour, and endogenous
monitoring precision that depends on the chosen working time arrangement. The key
contribution of the model is to analyse how working time autonomy interacts with the two
personality traits, and to derive testable empirical implications. While there is qualitative and
case-study evidence suggesting that personality traits moderate employee responses to working
time arrangements (e.g., Kelliher and Anderson, 2010; Lambert, 2000), a rigorous theoretical
analysis of how the interaction of personality traits and working time autonomy affects
performance has not yet been provided in the literature. Our theoretical model shows that the
impact of working time autonomy on worker performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, due to
high working time autonomy and low monitoring precision, the employer prefers low-powered
extrinsic incentives. Consequently, workers choose low effort under the optimal incentive
scheme. On the other hand, additional intrinsic motivation and incentives from reciprocating
received autonomy can provide extra effort, so that the overall impact of working time autonomy
on effort depends on which effect dominates.
Our empirical analysis tests which of the two theoretical effects is stronger in practice. It
draws on one of the most extensive household survey panel datasets in Europe, the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which includes information on individual workers and on the
firms in which they are employed. Our empirical findings imply that SMWT has a moderate,
positive net effect on worker effort, a result which is very robust across a range of alternative
performance measures and across various specifications, including an instrumental variables
approach. In addition, we find that this positive effort effect is largely driven by increased
intrinsic worker motivation, whereas reciprocity does not seem to be an important factor.
There are several advantages of using the SOEP. First, the representativeness of the data set
allows us to draw more generalizable conclusions than parts of the existing literature that have
4looked at non-random or selected samples. Second, the panel character of the data improves
upon the vast majority of the empirical literature in this field that is based on cross-sectional
data. This allows us to address potential endogeneity problems and thus to derive managerial
implications with regard to an effective use of SMWT. Third, although measures of effort or
performance at work are usually difficult to find in individual survey data spanning a range of
different occupations and firms, the SOEP offers several alternatives. Our main measure for
worker effort is the difference between actual and contractual working hours to which we also
refer as extra working time. We believe that this is a legitimate measure of worker effort,
because spending time at work is clearly costly to the worker in terms of opportunity cost, and
more time spent at work is likely to increase the worker’s output (e.g., Bell and Freeman, 2001).
But we also use alternative proxies for performance, such as hourly wages and absenteeism from
work.
Our empirical approach addresses several endogeneity problems. Suppose that more (or less)
motivated employees select into workplaces or jobs with SMWT, or that firms that require
higher effort from their employees (or that offer more incentives for effort) are more likely to
operate SMWT. This would lead to a spurious non-causal association between SMWT and
worker performance. We deal with this by including worker-firm spell fixed effects. This implies
that the variation we exploit results from changes in SMWT that workers experience while being
employed in the same firm, thus holding time-invariant unobserved worker and firm
characteristics constant. A remaining threat to identifying a causal effect occurs if firms that
introduce SMWT change other aspects of the job that may affect worker performance, such as
performance monitoring, autonomy in carrying out tasks, task content, or aspects of the work
contract. We deal with such concerns by controlling for the degree of performance monitoring,
overall job autonomy, a large set of narrowly defined 4-digit occupation dummies, job
satisfaction and aspects of the work contract such as full-time status, contractual working time
and fixed-term employment. Moreover, in order to account for any potentially remaining time-
varying unobserved heterogeneity, we also report results from an instrumental variables
estimation strategy. Finally, we explore the heterogeneity of the SMWT effect using a quantile
regression approach.
Our theoretical approach is related to the growing field of behavioural economics. The
model used in this paper integrates the problem of hidden costs of control as introduced by the
5seminal paper of Falk and Kosfeld (2006). By using a laboratory experiment, they show that
agents will choose lower performance if the principal limits their discretion by imposing a
minimum performance standard. In that case, the agents feel distrusted by the principal, which
destroys part of their intrinsic motivation. Falk and Kosfeld mention different possibilities for a
minimum performance standard, in particular “a minimum presence requirement” (p. 1611),
which would violate strong forms of SMWT like working from home. Ellingsen and
Johannesson (2008) consider a behavioural economic model that can explain the findings of Falk
and Kosfeld. In their setting, forgoing control can signal a prosocial attitude of the principal,
which leads to higher motivation of the agent if being of a prosocial type. Benabou and Tirole
(2006) develop another theory of prosocial behaviour, which includes intrinsic motivation, being
also important for our model. Our theoretical approach is most closely related to Delfgaauw and
Dur (2008) by modelling intrinsic motivation and to Dur et al. (2010) by modelling reciprocity.
Our paper contributes to the existing empirical literature on the effect of working time
autonomy on individual performance. Using data from seven biopharmaceutical firms in one US
state, Eaton (2003) finds that employee control over time, pace and place of work has a positive
impact on perceived productivity and organisational commitment. Analysing one cross-section
of international survey data, Lyness et al. (2012) find that worker control over working time has
a positive association with organisational commitment and job satisfaction. In a largely
qualitative study covering workers from three private sector organisations in the UK, Kelliher
and Anderson (2010) additionally find evidence for increased work intensification and conclude
that employees reciprocate when given the opportunity to work flexibly by exerting additional
effort. Based on personnel records of call centre employees from a large Chinese multinational
firm, Bloom et al. (2015) conduct an intervention study on the effects of work from home (as an
element of worker autonomy) on individual performance. Apart from a 13% productivity
increase, the authors find an additional performance effect caused by employee self-selection.
Based on experimental evidence and distinguishing between dull and creative tasks, Dutcher
(2012) draws mixed conclusions. The author finds that while the autonomy to work from home is
associated with an 11-20% productivity increase when workers deal with creative tasks,
individual productivity declines by 6-10% when workers deal with dull tasks. This mixed
evidence is confirmed by the field- and laboratory-based analyses of Leslie et al. (2012) who find
that the effect of flexible work practices (including control over time and place of work) on a
6worker’s career depends on whether management interprets the employees’ choice of flexible
work practices as a signal of high or low organisational commitment.
In sum, the current empirical evidence on the impact of working time flexibility and
autonomy on employee performance is quite inconclusive. Moreover, existing studies differ
substantially with respect to validity and representativeness, so that the generalisability of these
findings is unclear. For example, Bloom et al. (2015), Dutcher (2012), and Leslie et al. (2012)
identify causal effects and thus provide reliable evidence for the specific settings that they
analyse. In contrast, studies that look at a wider context by analysing more general survey data
(e.g., Lyness et al., 2012) exploit cross-sectional data, and thus have only limited means of
addressing endogeneity problems, which implies that management implications cannot be drawn
from their results. In our study, we apply both representative panel data and estimation strategies
that account for a wide range of potential endogeneity problems associated with working under
an SMWT regime.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we develop a theoretical
model that analyses the consequences of SMWT on employee effort. Section 3 describes the data
and variables and provides first empirical insights by discussing some descriptive statistics. The
empirical analysis is split in two parts. In Section 4, we investigate the overall impact of SMWT
on employee effort, while Section 5 is devoted to a supplementing complementarity analysis that
explicitly focusses on the role of worker reciprocity and intrinsic motivation as potential
moderating drivers of the SMWT effort effect. In Section 6, we conduct a range of robustness
checks that clarify the interpretation of our results, and in Section 7 we use quantile regressions
to further explore the heterogeneity of the effect. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical model of self-managed working time and effort choice
We analyse the consequences of SMWT on workers’ effort choices by modifying the principal-
agent approach of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1990, 1991).2 Our modifications allow
workers to be intrinsically motivated and to reciprocate the employer’s offered degree of
2 We do not build on the seminal paper by Aghion and Tirole (1997), because it does not include intrinsic motivation
and reciprocity and considers the pure motivational effect of becoming authorised without including incentive
contracts.
7working time autonomy. Furthermore, we pay attention to a loss of control by the employer due
to the workers’ higher discretion under SMWT. Finally, we take into account that the employer
might compensate the loss of control by the use of alternative control instruments.
In our setting, we consider a risk-neutral, profit-maximizing employer who has to hire a
worker in order to run a business. The worker is risk-averse. His utility function is given by 1 –
exp(– rÂy) with r > 0 denoting the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant absolute risk aversion and y
the worker’s income. This income may also include perceived income from intrinsic motivation.
The worker has the reservation value 0tv in monetary terms, which indicates his best
alternative job opportunity in the labour market.
By choosing non-negative effort e, the worker contributes e units to the employer’s profit.
The employer cannot directly observe the worker’s effort choice, but he can make use of the
verifiable performance measure H em . Both e and İ are unobservable by the employer, which
leads to a standard moral-hazard problem. The term İ describes a normally distributed error or
noise component with İ ~  NV /,0 2AN . Thus, m is an unbiased estimator of the worker’s true
effort choice. The variance NV /2A depends on the employer’s decision whether to give the
worker autonomy over his working time (A = 1) or not (A = 0). In other words, A = 1 indicates
the choice of SMWT by the employer, whereas A = 0 describes a working time arrangement with
less worker autonomy. We assume that 20
2
1 VV ! , that is, the introduction of SMWT is
accompanied by a higher discretion of a worker, which leads to a less precise monitoring of his
daily work by the employer in terms of 20
2
1 /1/1 VV  (e.g., by the worker’s possibility of
working at home). The parameter 0!N measures the intensity of chosen input and output
control by the employer with },{ HL NNN  and HL NN  . Exercising control is costly for the
employer. We assume that the employer’s costs for choosing N amount to 0)( !NK with
0!cK . The performance measure m includes input-related indicators (e.g., control of working
time, monitoring daily work) as well as output-related indicators (e.g., control of output quantity
and quality). Whereas the introduction of SMWT leads to a loss of control since the employer
foregoes an important input-related performance indicator, investment in additional control
instruments via N can compensate for this loss.
8We assume that the employer induces extrinsic motivation by offering the linear incentive
scheme mmw ED  )( , where D is a fixed wage component and mE incentive pay based on
measured performance. In the following, we look for the optimal contract, consisting of an
incentive scheme )(mw , a working time regime ^ 1`,0A and a control intensity },{ HL NNN  .
We further deviate from the Holmstrom-Milgrom framework by introducing intrinsic
motivation and reciprocal behaviour. Intrinsic motivation is modelled as in Delfgaauw and Dur
(2008) via the worker’s (perceived) income function3
.0and0,0,0)0(with)()()( !dcc!c  AA VVVeceVmwy JJ (1)
The term )()( ecmw  describes the usual earned income minus effort costs. 0)( t eVAJ
characterises the perceived income from intrinsic motivation, which may depend on the
employer’s choice of the working time arrangement. Hence, our setup assumes that the worker
directly benefits from exerting positive effort. Intrinsic motivation is an individual characteristic
of the worker that may be independent of the employer’s choice of A (i.e., 01 JJ  is possible).
However, the modelling also allows intrinsic motivation being reinforced by SMWT (i.e.,
01 JJ ! ). This reinforcement is supported by recent findings in behavioural economics.
Following the concept of hidden costs of control introduced by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), A = 0
can be interpreted as choosing control over the worker’s daily activity, which destroys part of his
intrinsic motivation as the worker feels distrusted by the employer. Social psychological
approaches also argue that the reinforcement seems realistic. For example, empowered workers
who obtain autonomy over their working time might feel committed to their task, which
increases intrinsic motivation (Baron and Kreps, 1999). In addition, under SMWT workers might
perceive a stronger internal locus of causality which leads to higher intrinsic motivation
according to self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000; Turban et al., 2007). To
allow for an explicit computation of the optimal incentive scheme, we assume that the perceived
income function is linear: V(e) = IÂe with I > 0.
3 Alternatively, intrinsic motivation could be modelled via realised output (e.g., Murdock, 2002). Such approach
would have strong parallels to the modelling of feeling committed. A committed worker feels responsible for the
produced output and obtains an extra utility when being successful (e.g., Francois, 2000; Besley and Ghatak, 2005;
Friebel and Schnedler, 2011; Choe and Ishiguro, 2012).
9Reciprocal behaviour by the worker can be motivated via social exchange theory, which was
originally introduced by Blau (1964) and Homans (1958), or via the gift-exchange approach,
suggested by Akerlof (1982). According to these approaches, a worker might feel obliged to
reciprocate in a positive way to benefits provided by the employer. The worker interprets these
benefits as signals of recognition for past performance, trust in his work morale or consideration
for his work-life balance, and thus responds by exerting additional effort. In the present context,
a worker might feel some basic reciprocity by getting a job offer with an interesting task from
the employer. Depending on the individual type of worker, these reciprocal feelings can increase
if a worker obtains autonomy over his working time, so that he exerts even more extra effort
compared to a situation without SMWT. To model reciprocal behaviour in our moral-hazard
context, we use the setup suggested by Dur et al. (2010), which focuses on the worker’s effort
cost function c(e):
^ ` .0and1,0with
2
)( 01
2
tt GGG Aeeec A (2)
According to (2), the worker feels non-negative reciprocity, indicated by .00 tG If 0G takes
its lower bound zero, the worker does not feel any basic reciprocity; otherwise the worker
behaves even reciprocally without SMWT. If 01 GG  , reciprocity is a purely individualistic trait
of the worker and insensitive to the employer’s choice of working time arrangement. If 01 GG ! ,
the worker positively reciprocates offered SMWT. Technically, in case of zero reciprocity, the
worker has a standard quadratic effort cost function and is not willing to choose positive effort
without compensation. However, if the worker is reciprocal, then he minimizes effort costs by
choosing Ae G and he is even willing to choose effort up to Ae G2 without being paid for it.
The timeline is the following. First, the employer offers a contract (A, ț, Į, ȕ) to the worker,
which specifies the working time regime, the monitoring intensity, and the details of the
incentive scheme )(mw . Then, the worker decides whether to accept the contract or not. If the
worker has accepted the contract, he will choose effort e, otherwise the game ends and the
worker gets his reservation value v . After the worker accepted the contract and chose effort, the
performance measure m is realised and payments to the employer and the worker are made.
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We solve the model by backward induction, starting with the last decision of the two players,
i.e., the worker’s effort choice. The worker maximises his expected utility or, equivalently, his
certainty equivalent
,
22
)(][
2
][
2
2
2
N
VEGJED AAA reeeVeyVarryECE   
which follows from the worker’s exponential utility function and noise being normally
distributed.4 The expression for CE shows that, in a technical sense, positive effects of SMWT
(based on intrinsic motivation and reciprocity) and effort are complements. The first-order
condition yields the following description of the optimal effort choice, e*:5
0)( **  c AA eeV GJE . (3)
Implicit differentiation yields 0)](1[/1// *** !cc ww ww eVee AA JGE and  ww Ae J/*
0)](1[/)( ** !ccc eVeV AJ . Thus, the worker’s effort rises by an increase in extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation, as well as in the degree of reciprocity.
The employer maximises expected profit E[e* – w(m)] – K(ț) = (1 – ȕ)e* – Į – K(ț) subject
to the incentive constraint (3) and the participation constraint CE vt . Since Į does not influence
incentives, but increases the employer’s labour costs, under the optimal incentive scheme the
employer chooses Į to make the participation constraint just bind and, hence, to extract all rents
from the worker. Solving CE v for Į and inserting into the expected profit function shows that
the employer chooses ȕ to maximise
)(
2
)(
2
)(
))(()(:),(
2
2*
2*
** NN
VEEGEEJENS KvreeeVeA AAA  (4)
with the function )(
* Ee being implicitly described by (3). The first-order condition yields6
> @ .0)())((1 2***  c NVEEGEEJ AAA rddeeeV (5)
4 See, similarly, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990, p. 88), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, p. 29).
5 The second-order condition ȖAV´´(e) – 1 < 0 is satisfied.
6 The second-order condition is clearly satisfied for our specification of V(e), see below.
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By using the parametric specification for the perceived income introduced above,
eIeV  )( , the incentive constraint (3) becomes AA Ie GJEE  )(* and the first-order
condition (5) reduces to )]/(1[/1 2* NVE Ar as description of the optimal extrinsic
incentives. The result for ȕ* shows that the following trade-off exists: The larger a worker’s
degree of risk aversion, r, and the smaller the overall precision of the performance measure,
2/ AVN , the lower powered will be optimal extrinsic incentives. This finding is not specific to
linear incentive schemes but also holds qualitatively for non-linear schemes (see the incentive-
intensity principle highlighted by Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). ȕ* also shows that extrinsic
motivation crucially depends on the working time arrangement and the control intensity. Since
SMWT leads to a loss of control in the sense of 20
2
1 VV ! , for a given control intensity N ,
optimal extrinsic incentives will be lower powered under SMWT compared to working time
arrangements that allow less worker discretion. However, the employer might prefer to combine
the different working time arrangements 1 A and 0 A with different control intensities. In
particular, the employer might prefer to combine SMWT (i.e., A = 1) with a high control
intensity HNN  to compensate for the loss of control due to higher worker discretion, and to
combine A = 0 with LNN  because control of the working time already ensures a sufficiently
precise performance measure m. To illustrate the possibility of such specific combinations of
working time arrangement and control intensity, we replace N by )(AN in the following, where
)(AN denotes the optimal control intensity under optimal extrinsic incentives and the working
time regime A.
At the first stage of the game, the employer chooses the contract (A, ț, Į, ȕ) that maximizes
his objective function (4). This optimal contract will comprise A = 1 if and only if ʌ(1,ț
ʌ(0,ț(0)) or, equivalently,
))]0(())1(([2
)1(
1
1
)0(
1
1
)2()2(
2
1
2
0
0011 NN
N
V
N
V KK
rr




t<<<< (6)
ZLWKȌA := įA + ȖAI denoting that part of the induced optimal effort )(* Ee that is due to intrinsic
motivation and reciprocal behaviour. Suppose, for a moment, that the difference in monitoring
12
costs, ))0(())1(( NN KK  , is zero as the employer chooses the same monitoring intensity under A
= 0 and A = 1 or that the difference is negligible. Condition (6) then shows that the employer will
prefer SMWT if the additional incentives from intrinsic motivation and reciprocity are
sufficiently large such that they dominate the possible disadvantage from a loss of control, which
leads to higher labour costs as the employer has to compensate the worker for a higher risk
premium.7 We only speak of a possible disadvantage because, depending on K(ț), the employer
might prefer HNN  )1( but LNN  )0( to compensate for the loss of control under SMWT. In
that case, it is possible that LH NVNV // 2021 d so that extrinsic incentives are restored. All in all,
the employer’s optimal contract will include HNN  instead of LNN  if, for given ^ 1`,0A , the
advantage of an increased precision of the performance measure exceeds the disadvantage in
form of higher monitoring costs.
Finally, we can investigate whether SMWT leads to more or less effort compared to the
working time regime A = 0. Inserting ȕ* into )(* Ee , using the notation )(AN , and comparing the
implemented optimal efforts under A = 0 and A = 1 shows that SMWT will lead to higher effort
if and only if
 
)1(
1
1
)0(
1
1
)1(
1
1
)0(
1
1
2
1
2
0
01012
1
2
0
01
N
V
N
VJJGG
N
V
N
V
rr
I
rr 


t



t<< . (7)
In words, the introduction of SMWT will boost worker effort if and only if the effort increase via
intrinsic motivation and reciprocal behaviour exceeds the possible effort decrease from lower
powered extrinsic incentives. Note that the left-hand side of (6) is larger than the left-hand-side
of (7). Thus, if the employer chooses the same control intensity under both working time
regimes, condition (7) will already imply condition (6) so that SMWT will always be optimal if
it leads to higher effort. We use condition (7) to establish two opposing hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS 1. Incentives from intrinsic motivation and reciprocity dominate the possible
loss in extrinsic motivation so that SMWT leads to extra effort compared to other working time
arrangements that give less discretion to workers.
7 Recall that the participation constraint is binding under the optimal contract so that the employer has to
compensate the worker for the whole risk premium.
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In contrast, if a worker’s intrinsic motivation and reciprocity are not very strong, or if they
are not context dependent but belong to the personal traits of a worker, extra incentives from the
introduction of SMWT will be negligible. If, at the same time, the large autonomy over working
time yields a considerable loss of control and the costs for additional control, )()( LH KK NN  ,
are quite large, the overall incentive effect of SMWT will become negative.
HYPOTHESIS 2. The loss of control from larger worker autonomy dominates the incentives
from intrinsic motivation and reciprocity so that SMWT leads to lower effort compared to other
working time arrangements that give less discretion to workers.
3 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Starting in 1984, the SOEP is an annual longitudinal survey of about 22,000 individuals living in
about 12,000 private households. The questionnaires cover a wide range of individual and job-
related characteristics. Job-related characteristics, for example, include employment and
occupational status, type of work contract, training, working conditions and working time
arrangements, professional mobility, earnings, and job satisfaction. In addition, the SOEP
contains a number of individual characteristics such as education, personality traits, living
circumstances, health and individual well-being, family biographies, career history and
household composition. The SOEP even includes some characteristics at the firm level, such as
firm size, sector affiliation and works council presence. Some of the items are surveyed annually,
while others are captured at more or less regular time intervals.8 All in all, the SOEP is probably
the most established and representative survey data set at the individual level in Germany, and
one of the largest and longest running household panel studies in Europe.
In order to examine the relationship between SMWT and employee effort, we utilise the
SOEP waves of 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011. These five panel waves contain information
about both the different forms of working time arrangements and measures of employee effort.
8 For more comprehensive information about the SOEP, see Wagner et al. (2007).
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We restrict the analysis to private and public sector employees and exclude self-employed
persons, civil servants and apprentices.9 Workers in the sample are aged between 17 and 65.
Workers are assigned to the respective working time regimes according to their answers to
the following survey question: “Which of the following working hours arrangements is most
applicable to your work?” Respondents could choose between four items.
 Fixed daily working hours
 Working hours fixed by employer, which may vary from day to day
 Flexitime within a working hours account and a certain degree of self-determination of
daily working hours within this account
 Working hours fixed by employee, which may vary from day to day (SMWT).
Table 1 displays the incidence of the different working hours regimes between 2003 and
2011. The table demonstrates that fixed daily working time is still the most common form of
working hours arrangements. It applies to about 43% of the employees in Germany. About 20%
of the workers make use of flexitime within a working hours account. Furthermore, about 22.5%
of employees work flexible hours that are determined by the employer. Finally, about 14.5% of
the employees report having the freedom to determine working time at their own discretion.
Table 1 also indicates that the percentages for each of the working time regimes remained quite
stable over the past decade.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here]
Table 2 provides some information about work effort in each of the four working time
regimes. As our main measure of extra effort, we use the difference between average actual
working hours (
a
WH ) and contractual working hours (
c
WH ) per week, labelled
ca
WHWHWH  ' . Although extra working time is an established measure of employee
effort in the literature (e.g., Bell and Freeman, 2001), we also explore alternative performance
9 Self-employed individuals are excluded, because they are their own boss by definition. Thus, they are able to
choose their working hours freely and may also lack a clear workplace definition (Eldridge and Pabilonia, 2010;
Golden, 2009). In addition, we remove obvious outliers from our sample. Specifically, we eliminate individuals who
reported unrealistically low monthly gross wages. Consequently, our sample includes workers who earn at least 400
Euros per month. In Germany, workers with a monthly gross wage of up to 400 Euros (450 Euros since 2012) are
often called ‘mini-jobbers’.
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measures used in the literature (such as absenteeism and hourly wages) to shed some light on the
question of whether extra time spent at work is used productively or not (see Section 6).
The first striking result in Table 2 is that, on average, workers provide some extra effort in
each of the four working time arrangements. However, there are substantial differences between
the categories with respect to the extent of extra effort. While, on average, WH' is relatively
small in the fixed working time regime (2.2-2.7 hours per week), the largest amount of extra
effort can be ascertained for employees with SMWT (6.9-8.1 hours per week). According to this
finding, employees with SMWT provide, on average, an extra effort of up to one additional
working day per week (in fulltime equivalents), which is about five hours more than workers in a
fixed working time regime deliver.
Of course, these descriptive statistics only provide some first insights about average effort
differences between the working time regimes. Conclusions regarding a meaningful effort effect
of SMWT (and other working time arrangements) can only be drawn from multiple regression
analyses that explicitly account for potential endogeneity bias.
4 Effort effects of self-managed working time
This section is devoted to the question whether or not SMWT has an impact on worker effort,
thus testing the general implications of condition (7) in our theoretical model that leads to the
derivation of Hypotheses 1 and 2. We expect the overall incentive effect to be positive if the
effort increase induced by SMWT via reciprocal behaviour and intrinsic motivation is stronger
than the potential effort decrease, which may result from the fact that SMWT is associated with a
loss of employer control. Conversely, we expect a negative effect of SMWT on worker effort if
the reverse is true.
4.1 Econometric model and estimation strategy
In order to measure the impact of SMWT on worker effort, we specify the following fixed
effects model:
.)(,321 ititjiitititititit uXJAFTEDSMWH  ' PEODDD (8)
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The dependent variable WH' measures the amount of extra effort (as defined above) of
employee i at time t. Our main explanatory variables are dummy variables for three of the four
working hours regimes, i.e., SMWT ( SM ), flexible working time determined by the employer
( ED ), and flexitime ( FT ). The coefficients 1D , 2D and 3D must be interpreted relative to the
excluded reference group of the fixed working time regime, where for our purpose 1D is of
particular interest. JA is a vector of dummy variables measuring the degree of overall job
autonomy. The vector X contains a rich set of socio-economic control variables which we
discuss in the remainder of this section, and for which we provide detailed definitions and
descriptive statistics in the supplementary material (see Table S5 of the supplementary material).
Finally, u is an idiosyncratic error term with zero mean and finite variance, and )(, itjiP is a
worker-firm spell fixed effect. The subscript )(itj stands for the firm j in which worker i is
employed at time t. )(, itjiP is equivalent to the inclusion of dummy variables for all unique
worker-firm combinations, and it controls for worker fixed effects and firm fixed effects as well
as their combination.
The inclusion of worker-firm spell fixed effects implies that the variation we exploit results
from changes in SMWT that workers experience while being employed in the same firm, thus
holding time-invariant unobserved worker and firm characteristics constant. This is important to
account for potential endogeneity of SMWT and associated bias in 1D that would arise if more
motivated workers choose to work under SMWT, or if firms that require higher effort from their
workers (or that offer more incentives for effort) are more likely to operate SMWT.
However, including worker-firm spell fixed effects does not yet deal with endogeneity based
on time-varying characteristics. Our first strategy to address this issue is to control for a vast
range of observed time-varying characteristics that may affect worker effort and could be
correlated with changes in SMWT. For example, firms that introduce SMWT may grant more
autonomy also in other job dimensions, or they may assign more challenging or interesting tasks.
These factors may increase worker effort and, if not controlled for, would be spuriously picked
up by the SMWT coefficient 1D . In particular, we control for an employee’s overall job
autonomy by including a set of dummy variables for different levels of occupational job
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autonomy summarized in JA.10 Moreover, the vector X includes an extremely rich set of almost
1,300 occupation dummies.11 As workers can change occupations at the same firm this partly
controls for changes in task content. We further include a variable on job satisfaction, which
proxies for confounding factors potentially related to SMWT to the extent that they affect worker
effort through perceived job satisfaction.
In addition, X contains individual characteristics such as years of schooling, gender,
nationality, marital status, the existence of children in the household, health status, satisfaction
with health and household income, as well as the number of hours devoted to leisure-time
activities. Besides occupation dummies and job satisfaction, it also includes further job
characteristics that may influence a worker’s extra effort, i.e., wage level, job tenure,
employment status (full-time or part-time, permanent or fixed-term), employer changes,
perceived job security, and previous experiences with full-time and part-time jobs as well as
unemployment. We also add firm-level information (firm size class and sector affiliation of the
respondent’s company) to the vector of control variables. Moreover, X also includes a set of
time dummies. Finally, in addition to the information provided by the survey, we match average
annual unemployment rates of the different German federal states as published by the German
Federal Statistical Office to our data. Table S5 (see the supplemental material) provides the
definitions and descriptive statistics of the complete set of variables used in this study.
Our second strategy to account for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity is an instrumental
variables estimation approach exploring lagged working time arrangements and a group-specific
share of SMWT workers as instruments, which is extensively discussed in the supplemental
material. Finally, in Section 6 we check whether our results are robust to additionally controlling
for changes in contractual working time that might be confounded with SMWT, and whether the
results hold across a range of different measures of worker performance as dependent variable.
10 The job autonomy dummy variables are generated from an ordinally scaled variable ranging from 0 to 5, where
higher values represent higher levels of job autonomy. The original autonomy variable called AUTONO$$ was
constructed by the SOEP and provides information on the occupational autonomy for all employed individuals. For
more details see the SOEP report ‘Documentation PGEN – Person-related status and generated variables’ under
https://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/diw_01.c.60055.de/pgen.pdf (p. 31) and the variables
descriptions in the supplemental material (Table S5).
11 This provides a very detailed picture. For example, the general occupation of waiter/waitress is broken up into
several occupational codes, such as assistant waiter, waiter, senior waiter, bartender, and bar mixologist.
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4.2 Empirical results
Table 3 displays the estimation results for the impact of SMWT on employee extra effort, as
measured by WH' . Column (1) contains the conventional ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of an unconditional specification, where the dependent variable is solely regressed on
the working time regime dummies and a constant. Column (2) describes the OLS estimates of the
working time regime and the overall job autonomy dummies conditional on the complete set of
covariates, while column (3) shows the marginal effects resulting from a Tobit maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation.12 The Tobit model accounts for the fact that WH' has a mass point
of values at zero, while negative values, though theoretically possible, are relatively scarce. Both
OLS and Tobit ML estimates are unlikely to provide consistent estimates of 1D , 2D and 3D ,
unless SM and the other working time variables are strictly exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with
both the unobserved worker-firm spell fixed effect, )(, itjiP , and the idiosyncratic error term, itu .
Hence, column (4) displays the fixed effects (FE) estimates of 1D , 2D and 3D from equation (8)
using the within estimator.13 This allows us to eliminate an endogeneity bias that is caused by
time-invariant unobserved factors.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The most striking result of our estimates is that throughout all specifications SMWT has a
positive influence on employee extra effort, which confirms Hypothesis 1. However, the
magnitude of the positive impact sharply declines when accounting for observed heterogeneity in
columns (2) and (3) as well as for time-constant worker- and firm-specific unobserved
heterogeneity in column (4). Starting with an initial estimate of about 5 hours per week in the
unconditional specification, the effect on average extra effort reduces to 3.3 hours in the
complete OLS model or 2.7 hours in the corresponding Tobit specification, respectively, and
finally ends up with a point estimate of 1.3 hours in the FE model.14 Put differently, from the
12 The control variables in Table 3 do not include performance evaluation, intrinsic motivation, and reciprocity that
we have highlighted in the theory section. These will be added to our empirical analysis in Section 5. As we show
below in Table 5, their inclusion does not change our main results in Table 3.
13 All estimates that are not reported in the tables of this paper are available from the authors upon request. Summary
statistics and a correlation matrix for major dependent and independent variables can be found in the supplemental
material (see Tables S3 and S5).
14 We also estimated a random effects (RE) Tobit model that was extended with additional regressors capturing the
worker-firm-specific means over time for all time-varying covariates (Mundlak’s approach). This model was used
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initial 5 hours of extra effort obtained in the unconditional OLS estimation about 1.7 hours can
be explained by observed individual, job or firm characteristics other than SMWT. From the
remaining 3.3 hours, about 2 hours can be attributed to unobserved factors, leaving an effect of
approximately 1.3 hours that can be ascribed to the policy of SMWT itself. This is about 26% of
the initially estimated impact.
Our main conclusions from these results are twofold. First, controlling for selection into
SMWT (based on unobserved time-invariant worker and firm characteristics) and for changes in
the workplace environment potentially related to SMWT (based on a large set of time-varying
workplace characteristics) clearly matters, as it reduces the positive effort effect of SMWT
considerably. Second, there remains a moderate positive effect. The 95% confidence interval
from our preferred FE estimate ranges between 1.0 and 1.7 hours. Therefore, our findings
document that Hypothesis 2 assuming a negative effect of SMWT on workers’ effort choice can
be clearly rejected.15 On the contrary, compared to the fixed working hours arrangement there
remains a positive regime effect of about 80 minutes of excess working time per week, which
supports Hypothesis 1. Additional instrumental variables estimates produce very similar results
(here, the SMWT effect is approximately 1.5 hours of extra working time per week) and the
associated endogeneity tests show that after controlling for worker-firm spell fixed effects there
remains no further endogeneity, which would suggest that the FE estimate of 1D can be
interpreted as a causal effect. An extensive discussion on this issue can be found in the
supplemental material.
5 Complementarity analysis
In this section, we go more into the details of our theoretical model derived in Section 2.
According to our empirical findings discussed in the previous section, the overall incentive effect
of SMWT is positive. This suggests that incentives from intrinsic motivation and worker
reciprocity dominate the opposing incentive effect due to a loss of employer control associated
because the FE Tobit model leads to inconsistent parameter estimates (e.g., Baltagi 2008). The SMWT effect
obtained in this regression is highly significant and larger than the conventional FE estimate (2.808 vs. 1.346). Since
the FE estimate is more conservative than its counterpart obtained from the RE Tobit-Mundlak model, and WH' is
not strictly censored at zero (because some negative values can be observed), we decided to continue with the FE
estimates and did not incorporate the RE Tobit-Mundlak model into Table 3.
15 We will come back to this point in a more detailed discussion in Section 7.
20
with SMWT. In the following, we aim at disentangling this positive overall incentive effect by
asking whether SMWT increases worker reciprocity, intrinsic motivation, or both. If SMWT
indeed promotes the workers’ intrinsic motivation or positive reciprocity, then these worker
characteristics and SMWT are complements in producing effort. Identifying such
complementarities enables us to refine the management implications to be drawn, because we
can then establish under which circumstances the introduction of SMWT has the strongest effort
effects.
5.1 Econometric modelling
By definition, complementary items have a larger performance impact when utilised jointly
rather than separately, and hence, their interaction effect on performance is positive. In this
section, we therefore test for positive interaction effects by augmenting our preferred FE model
(8) with interaction terms on SMWT and the worker characteristics of intrinsic motivation and
reciprocity.
In order to be able to precisely estimate the interaction terms of interest, it is important to
augment the econometric model not only with proxies for intrinsic motivation and worker
reciprocity, but also with a measure that reflects the potential impact of extrinsic motivation on
employee effort. Recall from our theoretical model in Section 2 that the employer might be
interested in choosing a high control intensity HNN  to compensate for the loss of control from
SMWT. In practice, the introduction of SMWT may be accompanied by a measure for
monitoring employee output as a substitute for the rescinded duty to register working hours.16 In
our econometric analysis, we address this idea by including a human resource policy measure
aimed at increasing extrinsic motivation. Specifically, we add a dummy variable for performance
evaluation, PE , which indicates whether or not an employee’s performance is regularly
evaluated by a supervisor.17 Not controlling for extrinsic motivation involves the risk that an
16 Based on case studies, Moen et al. (2011a, 2011b) analyse such scenarios, which they call ‘results only work
environment (ROWE)’.
17 The information about performance evaluations was originally only surveyed in 2004, 2008 and 2011. We
replaced the missing values by imputing the 2004 observations to 2003 and 2005, and by imputing the 2008
observations to 2007 and 2009. Imputation might be inappropriate when workers switched employers. Our results
are, however, virtually the same when we re-estimate equation (15) on a sample of workers who stayed with their
employer.
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effort effect, which is effectively caused by extrinsic motivation, would falsely be attributed to
intrinsic motivation or worker reciprocity.
Recall first that according to self-determination theory employees who perceive a stronger
internal locus of causality are likely to exert a higher effort level due to increased intrinsic
motivation. Working under an SMWT arrangement should strengthen the perception of an
internal locus of causality, and this might be the reason for the positive effort effect of SMWT
that was identified previously. Technically, in our model in Section 2, the left-hand side of
condition (7) increases in the intrinsic motivation parameter I if 01 JJ ! , i.e., if intrinsic
motivation under SMWT is higher than under a working time arrangement with less worker
autonomy.
We test for such a complementary relationship by interacting our SMWT variable in the
working hours regression with a measure for intrinsic motivation. For this purpose, we make use
of a variable that gives information about an employee’s work morale or work attitude,
respectively. More precisely, we consider the responses of the surveyed individuals to the
question: “If you could choose your own number of working hours, taking into account that your
income would change according to the number of hours: How many hours would you want to
work?” From this we construct a binary measure of intrinsic motivation IM that takes the value
1 if a worker’s desired weekly working hours are equal or higher than his contractual weekly
hours, and the value 0 if the desired hours fall short of contractual working time. Hence, we
assume that the desire to work at least as much hours as contractually agreed serves as a signal
for an employee’s sensation of joy at work, commitment to the job, or his aspiration level
concerning work attitude or work morale.
This assumption would be violated in the following cases. First, workers may wish to work
longer hours because their current work load is so high that they are not able to finish their tasks
within their contractually agreed working hours. Second, workers may be extrinsically motivated
to work longer hours in order to earn more money by changing from part-time to full-time
employment or in order to increase their probability of receiving an overall pay rise or a
promotion. To provide evidence supporting the idea that IM indeed measures intrinsic
motivation, as opposed to work load or extrinsic motivation, we restrict our sample to full-time
workers and regress IM on a number of proxies for work load (“Work strain”, “Time
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pressure”), extrinsic motivation (“Paid overtime”, “Expected promotion”, Expected pay rise”),
and various dimensions of intrinsic motivation (“Job satisfaction”, “Sacrifice”, “Unpaid
overtime”, “Hard-working”, “Thorough”, “Task efficiently”, “Joy at work”). The results and the
precise variable definitions are reported in Table 4. Each row of the table represents results from
a separate linear regression where IM is regressed on each of the single indicator variables
separately.18
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The results are striking. While all the indicators for intrinsic motivation are highly significant
and positively associated with IM , none of the work load or extrinsic motivation indicators is
positively related to IM . Both work load indicators and paid overtime are even negatively
associated with IM . An employee’s desire to work at least as much hours as contractually
agreed thus indicates joy at work, (over)commitment to the job, or a high job-related aspiration
level, and thus expresses typical dimensions of intrinsic motivation.
Furthermore, recall that according to social exchange theory and the gift-exchange approach,
a worker may be encouraged to provide extra effort as an act of positive reciprocity in response
to being granted SMWT. In our theoretical model discussed in Section 2, this idea is explicitly
considered as condition (7) will be more likely to be satisfied if 01 GG ! . Thus, we would expect
the effort effect of reciprocity to be stronger for SMWT workers than for employees who do not
work under an SMWT arrangement. We test this idea by interacting our SMWT variable with a
binary measure R that distinguishes high-level from low-level reciprocators. We constructed R
from the respondent’s degree of approval, measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(“does not apply to me at all”) to 7 (“applies to me perfectly”), to the following statements: (a)
“If someone does me a favour, I am prepared to return it.” (b) “I go out my way to help
somebody who has been kind to me before.” (c) “I am ready to bear personal costs to help
18 As indicated in the last column of Table 4, the reason for running separate regressions rather than incorporating all
indicators into one regression model lies in their very different availability across the panel waves. Limited
availability across the panel waves is also the reason why most of the intrinsic motivation proxies in Table 4 could
not be used as the main IM indicator. Only job satisfaction and the share of unpaid overtime are surveyed annually.
We did not use job satisfaction as a measure for IM because this measure is an overall measure also including
dimensions other than intrinsic motivation, such as satisfaction with pay, promotion prospects, or supervision.
Furthermore, we did not use the share of unpaid overtime as our IM measure because whether overtime is paid or
unpaid depends partly on the employer, occupation and industry, and thus it is unclear to what extent the share of
unpaid overtime indeed reflects worker preferences or motivation.
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somebody who helped me before.” For each individual we calculated the average across the three
questions and defined R to be equal to one if an individual’s average equals or exceeds the
median, and equal to 0 if it is below the median.19 Our regression model can then be written as
.)(,654
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Here, 1S indicates the effect of intrinsic motivation on WH' for workers without SMWT,
while 41 SS  captures the corresponding effect for SMWT workers. The term 1S corresponds
to 0J in our theoretical model, while 41 SS  is the empirical analogue for 1J . As a result,
04 !S would support our theoretical prediction 01 JJ ! . In addition, 04 !S would indicate
complementarity between SMWT and intrinsic motivation implying that SMWT is particularly
effective when targeted towards intrinsically motivated workers. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3. The effort effect of intrinsic motivation is stronger for SMWT workers than
for non-SMWT workers, so SMWT and intrinsic motivation are complements in producing
worker effort.
Moreover, 2S measures the effect of positive reciprocity on WH' for workers without SMWT,
while 52 SS  indicates the corresponding effect for SMWT workers. Note that 2S corresponds
to 0G in our theoretical model, while 52 SS  reflects 1G . Hence, 05 !S would confirm the
theoretical prediction 01 GG ! . Furthermore, 05 !S would indicate a complementary association
between SMWT and reciprocity implying that SMWT is particularly effective when targeted
towards positively reciprocating workers. We can therefore state the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4. The effort effect of positive reciprocity is stronger for SMWT workers than
for non-SMWT workers, so SMWT and reciprocity are complements in producing worker effort.
19 Information about reciprocity is originally surveyed only in 2005 and 2010. We therefore replaced the missing
values by imputing the 2005 observations to the years 2003 and 2007, and by imputing the 2010 observations to the
years 2009 and 2011. This procedure should not be problematic, because personality traits are unlikely to change
very quickly over time. For a short summary of the debate on whether personality traits can be assumed to be time-
constant or time-varying, see Heineck and Anger (2010).
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Finally, 06 !S would indicate complementarity between SMWT and performance
evaluations implying that it is more effective to introduce SMWT jointly with measures of output
control.
5.2 Empirical results
Table 5 displays the parameter estimates of the SMWT variable ( SM ) as well as the intrinsic
motivation ( IM ), reciprocity ( R ), and performance evaluation (PE ) variables, and the
corresponding interaction effects. The specification in column (1) extends equation (8) by
including IM , R , and PE and shows that, compared to the results in column (4) of Table 3,
the SMWT effect is barely affected by the inclusion of these additional variables. The remainder
of Table 5 is restricted to full-time workers for whom our IM measure is more reliable (see the
discussion in Section 5.1). As column (2) shows, this restriction leads to a moderate increase in
the SMWT coefficient compared the effect in column (1) (1.657 vs. 1.289, corresponding to
about 100 minutes more working hours per week vs. about 80 minutes). Moreover, we find that
both intrinsic motivation and reciprocity affect employee extra effort positively, but the effect of
intrinsic motivation exceeds the reciprocity effect in terms of size and significance. On the
contrary, performance evaluations do not contribute to increased worker effort significantly. The
finding that the main SMWT effect does not decline when including the performance pay
variable is important, because it suggests that the SMWT effect is not simply driven by the fact
that firms have replaced their previous input monitoring activities (recorded working hours) by
output monitoring via performance evaluation.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In column (3) we present the results from the estimation of equation (9), allowing for
complementarity between SMWT and IM , R and PE . In column (4) we extend that
specification by breaking PE up in two types of performance evaluation, with and without
consequences on pay or promotion ( 1PE and 2PE ).
20 Our results demonstrate a distinct
20 Performance evaluations with consequences have an influence on an employee’s monthly gross salary, yearly
bonus payments, future salary increases, or potential promotions. Distinguishing between performance evaluations
with and without consequences might roughly correspond to the distinction of formal versus informal performance
evaluation. However, we cannot entirely rule out that some subtle forms of informal performance evaluation may
not be picked up by our performance evaluation measure.
25
complementary relationship between intrinsic motivation and SMWT. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term SMIM u – corresponding to 4S in
equation (9) – implies that the combination of being intrinsically motivated and working under
SMWT yields an extra effort effect over and above the sum of the two separate effects of being
only intrinsically motivated ( 1S ) and of working only under SMWT ( 11D ). In particular,
816.04  S in column (3) and 824.04  S in column (4), both significant at the 5% level,
suggest that the effect of intrinsic motivation on extra effort is about 50 minutes per week higher
for workers with SMWT than for workers without SMWT, confirming our theoretical prediction
01 JJ ! from Hypothesis 3.21 At the same time, the positive interaction effect also implies that
intrinsically motivated workers have a higher SMWT effect (amounting to
1.869=0.816+1.053 hours; see column (3)) than not intrinsically motivated workers (whose
SMWT effect is 1.053).
Turning to Hypothesis 4, we note from Table 5 that the interaction effect of SMWT with
reciprocity SMR u – corresponding to 5S in equation (9) – is 0.088 in column (3) and 0.095 in
column (4), both times not significantly different from zero. This implies that we cannot find
empirical support for our theoretical prediction 01 GG ! and suggests that SMWT does not
amplify a worker’s level of reciprocity, and thus, reciprocity is not found to be complementary to
SMWT in producing extra effort. This finding is in line with Giardini and Kabst (2008) who
argue that German employees might not perceive the employer’s provision of work-family
practices (such as SMWT) as a special benefit that would elicit a sense of obligation in them to
reciprocate. Instead, due to Germany’s long tradition as a social market economy, German
employees are assumed to expect a lot from their employers, which explains their lack of
reciprocity. If indeed specific characteristics of the German labour market are responsible for the
missing impact of reciprocity, this fact will even strengthen our general findings on the positive
incentive effects of SMWT. In that case, the sole effect of intrinsic motivation complemented by
SMWT already leads to extra incentives in the German labour market. Due to additional
incentives from reciprocity, the positive incentive effect of SMWT must therefore be even larger
in those labour markets that lack the German characteristic mentioned above.
21 For workers without SMWT, the effect of intrinsic motivation in column (2) is 0.687 (about 40 minutes per
week), whereas this is 0.687+0.816=1.503 (about 1 hour and 30 minutes per week) for workers with SMWT.
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Performance evaluations, however, do not increase the SMWT effect. This holds for both the
combined performance evaluation measure (column (3) of Table 5) and the separate performance
evaluation measures that differentiate between performance evaluations with and without
consequences (column (4) of Table 5). The interaction terms of SMWT with performance pay
SMPE u – corresponding to 6S in equation (9) – are statistically insignificant. Hence, we
conclude that intrinsic motivation is strongly complementary to SMWT, but reciprocity and
performance evaluations are not. From a management perspective, SMWT is therefore likely to
boost worker effort the most if it is targeted towards highly self-motivated workers, whereas
accompanying performance evaluations do not seem to be necessary to keep worker effort high.
Intrinsic motivation should therefore be a criterion for selecting employees into SMWT
arrangements.
6 Alternative performance measures
In this section, we probe the robustness of our results and try to gain additional insight on how to
interpret the previous results by using a range of different performance measures. We report the
results in Table 6, which presents the respective SMWT coefficient 1D resulting from different
estimation approaches.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
In Panel A of Table 6, we use alternative measures of extra work, which are all based on
hours of working time. Recall that in our baseline specification the dependent variable WH' is
defined as an employee’s actual working time minus his contractual working time. Throughout
the paper, we interpret the positive SMWT effect on WH' as an increase in workers’ extra
effort. However, this interpretation would be wrong if firms routinely reduced contractual
working time after the introduction of SMWT.22 Then, WH' would increase without any
increase in actual working time, and the interpretation of the effect in terms of extra effort would
22 Recall in this context our descriptive results displayed in Table 2, according to which SMWT employees, on
average, indeed appear to be faced with slightly lower contractual working hours than employees in the other
working time arrangements. We also ran an auxiliary FE regression model, where contractual working hours were
regressed on SMWT and the same set of covariates that was also applied to produce the estimates of Table 3,
column (4). The SMWT effect on contractual working hours is negative and highly significant, albeit quite moderate
(coefficient: 332.0 – corresponding to about 20 minutes less working time per week than the contractual weekly
working time of employees in a fixed working time regime –, standard deviation: 0.118).
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be flawed. In the first row of Panel A we therefore test to what extent our results may be driven
by changes in contractual working hours by adding contractual working hours as a covariate to
our baseline specification of equation (8). Holding contractual working hours constant in that
way ensures that any resulting SMWT effect can only be driven by increases in actual working
time. The OLS and FE effects for this robustness check are reported in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 6, respectively. The effects are very similar to our baseline results of columns (2) and (4)
in Table 3 and thus rule out that our main results are driven by systematic changes in contractual
working hours.23
In the remaining rows of Panel A, we present further robustness checks where we re-
estimate our baseline specification of equation (8) using alternative measures of extra work.
First, we use the amount of self-reported overtime work in the recent month prior to the survey
(overtime last month). In addition, we use a measure labelled 2WH' that, similarly to our main
dependent variable WH' , is defined as actual minus contractual working time. However, while
our original measure defines actual working time only by the average actual hours spent doing
the main job, the alternative measure additionally includes commuting times as well as the
number of working hours committed to a potential second job.24 Both of these specifications
show positive and significant SMWT effects (albeit somewhat smaller than our baseline effect),
further suggesting that our results do not depend on the exact definition of working time that we
use to define the dependent variable.
A further worry in interpreting our main result is the question whether the extra time spent
on the job as a consequence of SMWT indeed represents an increase in the worker’s output and
is thus desirable from the point of view of the employer, or whether the extra time is perhaps
spent inefficiently. Put differently, less monitoring might induce SMWT workers to work more
but less efficiently. We address this concern in Panel B of Table 6 by showing results from a
series of pooled cross section and panel data regressions of our baseline specification in equation
(8), where we replaced our original dependent variable WH' by alternative measures of
23 The coefficient for contractual working hours is highly significant with the anticipated negative sign (-0.094 in the
pooled OLS and -0.152 in the FE model; not displayed in Table 6).
24 In order to calculate the actual working hours variable in this case, we analysed the responses to the following
question: “How many hours do you spend on job, apprenticeship, and second job on a typical weekday, Saturday,
and Sunday (including commuting times)?” Actual working hours are then calculated as the number of working
hours on a typical workday times 5 plus the number of working hours on typical Saturdays and Sundays.
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individual performance. First, we use worker absenteeism measured as the number of days
absent from work as an alternative measure for (inverse) worker performance (using a linear
specification in columns (1) and (2) and a Tobit specification in columns (3) and (4)).25 This is a
popular measure of worker performance in studies using large-scale observational survey data
(e.g., Audas et al., 2004; Cornelissen et al., 2011; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005). The rationale for
using this variable is that after controlling for variables that capture a worker’s health (which are
included among our baseline regressors), days absent from work indicate low work morale or
shirking rather than sickness-related absence. The other alternative dependent variables in Panel
B of Table 6 are hourly wages (measured as monthly gross wage divided by actual working
hours), an ordinally scaled measure indicating an employee’s worries about job security, and a
binary measure indicating whether or not the respondent sees himself as someone who completes
tasks effectively and efficiently.26
Importantly, SMWT has a negative effect on absenteeism, reducing the number of days
absent from work by about 1.3 days per year in the FE model (column (2)) and the random
effects (RE) Tobit-Mundlak model (column (4)), while holding health indicators and other
control variables constant in both specifications. This suggests that SMWT indeed increases
work morale, thus supporting our view that the extra time spent at work is productive. This
interpretation is further corroborated by the fact that we find no negative SMWT effect on hourly
wages and on self-reported efficiency (which arguably are proxies for a worker’s productivity
per hour spent on the job), or on worries about job security. Overall, therefore, there is little
reason to believe that our SMWT effect on extra working hours measures inefficient usage of
working hours rather than employee effort. This is also supported by firm-level evidence of
Beckmann (2016) who finds a causal impact of the introduction of SMWT on both firm
productivity and wage costs.
Finally, in Panel C of Table 6, we re-estimate our baseline model using various measures of
non-standard working hours as alternative dependent variables. These include work in the
evening or at night as well as work at weekends. From the respondents’ information we generate
25 The original question in the SOEP questionnaires is: “How many days were you unable to work in year X due to
illness?”
26 There are three categories for the ‘worries about job security’ variable: strong worries (value 1), some worries
(value 2), and no worries (value 3). The original efficiency variable is ordinally scaled between 1 and 7. The dummy
variable has been set to 1 if the ordinal variable takes the values 6 or 7. The definitions of all additional variables
applied in this section can be found in Table S5 (see the supplemental material).
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dummy variables indicating whether or not employees sometimes work in the evenings (after 7
p.m.), at night (after 10 p.m.), as well as on Saturdays and Sundays, and estimate linear
probability models.27 According to the fixed effects estimates (column (2)), SMWT increases the
probability that a worker works non-standard working hours by between 3.9% for work at night
and 8.4% for evening work.
Our overall conclusion from these robustness checks is that the SMWT effect on extra work
is not an artefact of the way in which our main dependent variable was defined. On the contrary,
it seems to represent a real increase in working time spent productively at work. Moreover, some
of the extension of working time as a result of SMWT seems to affect non-standard working
hours such as evening, night, and week-end work.
7 Does the SMWT effect vary along the distribution of extra working time?
In some European countries (e.g., Germany and Switzerland) there is an ongoing political debate
on the question whether the introduction of SMWT perhaps harms employee well-being by
promoting substantial self-organized work intensification (e.g., Lehndorff, 2007; Singe and
Croucher, 2003).28 Some practitioners, such as employer and employee representatives, seem to
be split on this question. While employer representatives typically emphasise the positive effect
that SMWT is expected to have on employees’ job autonomy and work-life balance, unions often
tend to oppose SMWT. One of their main arguments is that recording working hours protects
workers from being exploited by the employer. Consequently, the omission of working hours
registration in SMWT arrangements would pressurise workers to intensify effort in order to meet
the employer’s expectations. The claim is that work intensification might reach a level that could
even harm the workers’ physical and mental health.29 SMWT is also controversially discussed
among managers, as was recently demonstrated by the cancelation of working from home (which
is often a component of SMWT) at Yahoo enacted by CEO Marissa Mayer. In particular, Mrs.
27 See Angrist and Pischke (2009, Section 3.4.2) for a justification of applying linear regression models to limited
dependent variables.
28 For the Swiss debate see, e.g., http://www.seco.admin.ch/dokumentation/publikation/00008/00022/04951/index.
html?lang=de. Additionally, in Switzerland SMWT arrangements may even come into conflict with current labour
legislation. For a general discussion on the impact of decentralisation practices on worker stress see, e.g., Azkenazy
(2001).
29 Another argument is that due to the omission of working hours registration, SMWT allows employers to deprive
their employees of paying overtime premiums.
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Mayer raised concerns that work from home would undermine the employees’ work morale
(Miller and Perlroth, 2013).
However, our results from Section 4 show that neither the concerns in terms of unhealthy
work intensification nor the shirking conjecture appear to be appropriate. On the contrary, we
find a moderate positive effect of SMWT on employee extra effort. This moderate effort increase
induced by SMWT clearly contradicts the shirking hypothesis and is presumably too small to
justify the claim of unhealthy work intensification. Moreover, we find no indication for
reciprocal work intensification as presumed, for example, in Kelliher and Anderson (2010).
On the other hand, given the fact that our SMWT estimate is an average effect, it may still be
possible that SMWT causes employee shirking in some workplaces and work intensification in
others depending on various factors, such as the culture and the nature of relationship. In order to
test whether the SMWT effect varies along the distribution of extra working time, we run a fixed
effects quantile regression model applying the estimation procedure introduced in Powell (2014a,
2014b). The estimation results for the SMWT effect are shown in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 demonstrates that the point estimate for SMWT indeed varies along the distribution
of extra working hours WH' ranging between 0.699 and 3.366 extra working hours per week.30
Furthermore, we observe a quite steady increase of the SMWT effect from lower to higher
quantiles. In sum, since the estimated SMWT effects are neither negative nor excessively high,
two conclusions arise from these results. First, there is no evidence for the conjecture that
SMWT promotes employee shirking. This holds even at lower quantiles of the distribution of
extra working hours. Second, we also do not find support for the (unhealthy) work intensification
hypothesis. This conclusion might perhaps be debatable if one focusses on the SMWT effects
estimated at higher quantiles. For example, the maximum SMWT effect of 3.366 extra hours per
week estimated at the 90% quantile translates to about 40 extra minutes per working day that can
be ascribed to the work under an SMWT regime. An amount of 40 extra minutes per day is, of
course, not negligible. However, we believe that this level of extra work should be compensated
by extensive decision rights of the employees to determine their own working hours. This
assessment is confirmed by studies that examine the effects of SMWT and other forms of
30 Apart from the SMWT coefficient at the 15% quantile, all other coefficients are highly significant.
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working time autonomy on stress at work or the workers’ mental health (e.g., Cottini and
Lucifora, 2013; Shvartsman and Beckmann, 2015). None of these studies found significant
associations between working time autonomy and stress intensity or mental health problems. In
fact, the results displayed in Figure 1 are consistent with our result on the complementary
relationship between SMWT and intrinsic motivation, i.e., the SMWT effect increases with
higher quantiles because intrinsically motivated workers are more likely to be present at higher
quantiles.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the impact of self-managed working time (SMWT), which provides
employees with autonomy over scheduling their own working hours, on employee effort. Our
theoretical model shows that SMWT will lead to an overall positive effect on effort if intrinsic
motivation and reciprocal behaviour dominate a possible decline of extrinsic incentives due to a
loss of control. Using a large representative individual-level panel data set, the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), we empirically examine the effect of SMWT on employee effort, as
measured by the difference of employees’ actual working time and their contractual obligation.
Without controlling for selection into SMWT based on observable and unobservable
characteristics, we find a large and significant association between SMWT and extra working
time, which sharply declines when accounting for observed and unobserved characteristics. Our
preferred fixed effects estimates imply the following decomposition of the raw difference of five
hours of extra work per week between workers with SMWT and workers with fixed working
time. About one hour and 40 minutes of the initial five weekly hours of extra working time can
be attributed to selection on observable individual, job or firm characteristics. Roughly another
two hours can be attributed to unobserved factors, leaving an average effect of approximately 80
minutes that can be ascribed to the policy of SMWT itself. We present additional evidence that
SMWT increases rather than reduces worker performance as proxied by a number of alternative
measures of extra work, individual productivity, and non-standard working hours. These results
justify our interpretation of the SMWT effect on extra working time as an effect on worker
effort. Furthermore, we find positive SMWT effects at various quantiles along the distribution of
extra working time, where effect sizes increase at higher quantiles. This additionally supports our
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previous results regarding the rejection of the shirking hypotheses, while at the same time there
is no reason to believe that SMWT promotes (unhealthy) work intensification.
We conduct supplementing analyses to obtain some information about potential
complementarities between SMWT, intrinsic motivation and worker reciprocity. First of all, we
find that SMWT amplifies the positive effort effect of an employee’s intrinsic motivation, where
intrinsic motivation is measured as an employee’s desire to work at least as much hours as
contractually agreed, which we show to be a signal for joy at work, commitment to the job, or a
high aspiration level concerning work attitude or work morale. Specifically, we find that the
effect of being self-motivated while working under an SMWT arrangement is approximately 1.5
hours per week, which exceeds the effect of being self-motivated without SMWT by about 50
minutes. However, we find no complementarity between SMWT and employee reciprocity,
which rules out reciprocity as a potential channel of the SMWT effect. Perhaps surprisingly, we
also find no complementarity between SMWT and performance evaluations as an indicator of
extrinsic motivation. This suggests that it is particularly effective to select intrinsically motivated
workers into SMWT, while additional performance evaluations do not boost the effort effect of
SMWT.
The main estimation strategy that we employed consists of controlling for worker-firm spell
fixed effects (holding time-invariant unobserved worker and firm characteristics constant) and
controlling for a large array of detailed time-varying worker and firm characteristics. We are
confident that this has removed the most important endogeneity biases. This view is confirmed
by an exploratory instrumental variables approach (see the supplemental material) which delivers
statistically significant results that are qualitatively similar to our main results (though with
wider confidence intervals). Nevertheless, it would clearly be desirable in future research to
analyse our research question by conducting a field experiment, for example, exploiting a
company-wide policy change towards SMWT, or (even better) implementing random assignment
of SMWT. That would probably allow estimating a cleaner causal effect than is possible to
estimate based on observational data. However, it should be born in mind that field experiments
usually apply to specific contexts (such as specific firms or specific occupations), and therefore
may have limited generalisability. We therefore believe that it is also important to conduct
generalisable studies such as ours, controlling for biases as much as is possible in a large-scale
observational dataset.
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The results of our study provide some important policy implications that are relevant for
both management and employee representatives. While the latter may be concerned about a
potential work intensification following the introduction of SMWT, managers might consider
adopting SMWT (e.g., in the context of fringe benefits or work-life balance programs) and
wonder whether SMWT is associated with increased employee effort or shirking. According to
our empirical results, the extra effort effect induced by SMWT is positive but modest, so both
employers and employees should benefit from the use of SMWT. Employers can benefit from
introducing SMWT, because, on average, SMWT arrangements do not encourage employee
shirking, but instead tend to elicit positive effort effects. The largest effort effect can be achieved
if managers select intrinsically motivated employees for working under SMWT. On the other
hand, employees should also benefit from SMWT, because the modest effort effect could
probably be compensated by the increased time autonomy coming along with SMWT. Consistent
with this idea is our finding that the effort increasing effect caused by SMWT is more a matter of
improved employee motivation than of reciprocal work intensification.
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Table 1: Incidence of different working time arrangements
Working time arrangement 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Total
Fixed daily working hours 44.8 43.8 42.3 41.7 41.3 42.9
Working hours fixed by employer 22.4 22.0 22.6 23.6 21.9 22.5
Flexitime within a working hours account 18.9 19.9 20.3 20.4 21.8 20.2
Working hours fixed by employee (SMWT) 13.9 14.3 14.8 14.3 15.0 14.4
N 9,583 8,755 8,785 8,752 6,915 42,790
Note: The means are displayed in percent. N is sample size.
Table 2: Actual and contractual working hours per week
Working time arrangement 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Total
Fixed daily working hours aWH 35.8 35.9 36.5 35.9 35.9 36.0
c
WH 33.6 33.6 33.8 33.5 33.3 33.6
WH' 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.4
Working hours fixed by employer aWH 37.6 37.9 37.9 37.6 38.0 37.8
c
WH 33.7 33.7 33.5 33.3 33.5 33.5
WH' 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.3
Flexitime within a working hours account aWH 39.8 40.1 39.7 39.6 40.0 39.8
c
WH 35.8 36.1 35.8 35.8 36.1 35.9
WH' 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9
Working hours fixed by employee (SMWT) aWH 38.1 40.2 41.1 41.0 39.1 39.9
c
WH 31.1 33.0 33.0 33.3 32.2 32.5
WH' 7.0 7.2 8.1 7.7 6.9 7.4
Difference between SMWT and fixed daily
working hours
SM
WH'
4.8 4.9 5.4 5.3 4.3 5.0
Note: The displayed values are average weekly working hours. aWH is average actual working hours per week,
c
WH is contractual working hours per week and ca WHWHWH  ' . SMWH' is the difference in WH' between
workers with SMWT and workers with fixed daily working hours. The calculations are based on 38,312
observations.
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Table 3: Effects of self-managed working time on employee extra effort
Estimation strategy OLS OLS Tobit ML FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-managed working time ( SM ) 4.987***
(0.163)
3.308***
(0.177)
2.684***
(0.127)
1.346***
(0.179)
Employer-determined working time (ED) 1.845***
(0.085)
1.407***
(0.093)
1.465***
(0.080)
0.758***
(0.110)
Flexitime (FT) 1.479***
(0.078)
0.732***
(0.093)
1.103***
(0.081)
0.602***
(0.118)
Low / medium job autonomy 0.309**
(0.139)
0.408***
(0.133)
0.139
(0.207)
Medium job autonomy 0.705***
(0.154)
0.918***
(0.145)
0.523**
(0.232)
Medium / high job autonomy 1.845***
(0.202)
1.784***
(0.173)
1.039***
(0.272)
High job autonomy 3.501***
(0.470)
2.688***
(0.322)
1.282***
(0.463)
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies No Yes Yes No
Time dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Worker-firm spell fixed effects No No No Yes
2
R / Pseudo- 2R / 2R -within 0.078 0.305 0.073 0.102
N 38,312 30,699 30,699 31,522
Note: * 1.0p ; ** 05.0p ; *** 01.0p . The dependent variable is WH' . The values in parentheses represent
robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. The specifications in columns (2) - (4) contain a set of
covariates described in Table S5, where the corresponding estimates are displayed in Table S4 (see the supplemental
material). The Tobit ML estimates displayed in column (3) represent marginal effects.
41
Table 4: Does IM measure intrinsic motivation, work load, or even extrinsic motivation?
Indicators Explanatory variables
Effect on
IM (OLS)
Available
panel waves
Intrinsic
motivation
Job satisfaction: Self-reported level of job
satisfaction
0.026***
(0.002)
2003-2011
Sacrifice: “Those closest to me say I sacrifice myself
too much for my job.”
0.044***
(0.011)
2006, 2011
Unpaid overtime: percentage of unpaid overtime
work in total overtime hours (last month)
0.027***
(0.010)
2003-2011
Hard-working: “I see myself as someone who does
not tend to be lazy.”
0.057***
(0.016)
2005, 2009
Thorough: “I see myself as someone who does a
thorough job.”
0.040***
(0.015)
2005, 2009
Task efficiency: “I see myself as someone who
accomplishes tasks effectively and efficiently.”
0.039***
(0.012)
2005, 2009
Joy at work: “I really enjoy my work.” 0.091***
(0.022)
2008
Work load Work strain: “The amount of work has increased
steadily over the last two years.”
-0.020*
(0.011)
2006, 2011
Time pressure: “Because of the high volume of work
there is often high time pressure.”
-0.025**
(0.011)
2006, 2011
Extrinsic
motivation
Paid overtime: percentage of paid overtime work in
total overtime hours (last month)
-0.027***
(0.010)
2003-2011
Expected promotion: self-reported probability of
receiving a promotion at the current place of
employment (%)
0.000
(0.008)
2003, 2005,
2007, 2009
Expected pay rise: self-reported probability of
receiving an individual pay rise that goes beyond the
collectively negotiated pay rate increase (%)
-0.005
(0.009)
2003, 2005,
2007, 2009
Note: * 1.0p ; ** 05.0p ; *** 01.0p . The dependent variable is IM . The values in parentheses represent
robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Job satisfaction is an ordinally scaled variable ranging
between 0 (completely unsatisfied) and 10 (completely satisfied). The variables explained in italic font are dummy
variables on an employee’s approval to the respective statement. The sample is restricted to full-time employees. All
specifications include the same control variables as the regression model displayed in Table 3, column (2).
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Table 5: Complementarity analysis
Estimation strategy FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-managed working time ( SM ) 1.289***
(0.190)
1.657***
(0.223)
1.053***
(0.355)
1.049***
(0.354)
Intrinsic motivation ( IM ) 0.706***
(0.091)
0.759***
(0.099)
0.687***
(0.100)
0.689***
(0.100)
Positive reciprocity ( R ) 0.164*
(0.096)
0.188*
(0.115)
0.177
(0.114)
0.176
(0.114)
Performance evaluation, overall (PE) -0.0154
(0.101)
-0.053
(0.120)
-0.047
(0.120)
Performance evaluation without consequences
( 1PE )
-0.276*
(0.159)
Performance evaluation with consequences
( 2PE )
0.114
(0.143)
Interaction ( SMIM u ) 0.816**
(0.344)
0.824**
(0.343)
Interaction ( SMR u ) 0.088
(0.335)
0.095
(0.335)
Interaction ( SMPE u ) -0.062
(0.354)
Interaction ( SMPE u1 ) -0.517
(0.624)
Interaction ( SMPE u2 ) 0.010
(0.373)
2
R -within 0.115 0.129 0.130 0.130
N 26,387 20,565 20,565 20,565
Note: * 1.0p ; ** 05.0p ; *** 01.0p . The dependent variable is WH' . The values in parentheses represent
robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Specification (1) refers to the full sample, whereas
specifications (2)-(4) are restricted to a sample of full-time employees. The specifications extend equations (8) and
(9) by the explanatory variables and interaction terms displayed. All estimation models additionally contain the
same control variables as the regression models displayed in Table 3, column (4).
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Table 6: The SMWT effect for alternative performance measures
Estimation strategy
Pooled OLS /
ordered logit
Linear FE / or-
dered logit FE
Tobit ML
RE Tobit-
Mundlak
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Alternative measures of extra work
WH' 3.221***
(0.177)
1.296***
(0.179)
Overtime last month 1.609***
(0.113)
0.691***
(0.130)
2WH' 1.444***
(0.239)
0.770***
(0.285)
Panel B: Alternative productivity measures
Absenteeism -1.224***
(0.424)
-1.306*
(0.788)
-1.238***
(0.346)
-1.279**
(0.564)
Worries about job security 0.264***
(0.048)
0.045
(0.094)
Hourly wage 1.271***
(0.218)
0.217
(0.195)
Task efficiency -0.006
(0.016)
-0.014
(0.039)
Panel C: Non-standard working hours
Work in the evening 0.218***
(0.012)
0.084***
(0.017)
Work at night 0.093***
(0.011)
0.039**
(0.015)
Work on Saturday 0.146***
(0.012)
0.068***
(0.016)
Work on Sunday 0.134***
(0.013)
0.040**
(0.017)
Note: * 1.0p ; ** 05.0p ; *** 01.0p . The values in parentheses represent robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level. The specifications include the same control variables as the corresponding regression models
displayed in Table 3. The WH' model additionally controls for contractual working hours. In the ‘Hourly wage’-
equation, the control variables ‘gross monthly wage’ and ‘satisfaction with household income’ are excluded from
the set of control variables. In the ‘Worries about job security’-model, the depended variable is ordinally scaled and
the dummy variables ‘strong worries about job security’ and ‘some worries about job security’ are excluded from
the set of control variables. The Tobit ML and RE Tobit-Mundlak estimates represent marginal effects.
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Figure 1: The effect of SM on WH' resulting from a fixed effects quantile regression
Note: The squares represent the point estimates for SMWT measured at different quantiles of the distribution of
extra working hours per week. The grey-shaded area represents the respective confidence intervals at the 95%
significance level. The quantile regression model includes the same control variables as the FE regression model
displayed in Table 3, column (4).
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Supplemental material (not intended to be published)
Section S1 examines whether our FE estimations discussed in Section 4.2 suffer from potentially
remaining endogeneity biases caused by unobserved time-varying heterogeneity. Here, our
estimation strategies are introduced and the results are discussed. Section S2 provides additional
information that is not included in the paper. First, a correlation matrix for major dependent and
independent variables is displayed in Table S3. Second, Table S4 refers to Table 3 containing the
OLS and FE estimates of the complete estimation models. Finally, Section S3 entails the
description and the descriptive statistics of the entire set of variables used in this study.
S1. Instrumental variables approaches
After controlling for worker-firm spell fixed effects according to equation (8), there may be an
additional bias due to a potential correlation between SM and itu , which may result from the
omission of time-varying characteristics that drive selection into a particular work time regime,
or from reverse causality. In the latter case, an employee’s decision in favour of SMWT may
depend on his actual working hours. Moreover, employees may sort into different working time
regimes based on time-varying unobserved characteristics, which also affect their effort choices.
Examples include personality traits that may change over time, or unobserved changes to an
individual’s life circumstances. If not addressed, both reverse causality and selection based on
time-varying unobservable characteristics might cause estimation biases.
To address these issues, we combine equation (8) with instrumental variables (IV)
approaches. Specifically, we use two related two-step identification strategies, where the first is
based on predictor substitution and the second relies on residual inclusion. Both approaches
require the estimation of reduced form equations for each of the three flexible working time
regimes in the first stage. For the first approach these equations are
it
SM
itjiititititititit ZZXJAFTEDSM 1)(,2121121111211 HQZZ-UMM   (S1)
it
ED
itjiititititititit ZZXJAFTSMED 2)(,2222121222221 HQZZ-UMM   (S2)
.3)(,2323121333231 it
FT
itjiititititititit ZZXJAEDSMFT HQZZ-UMM   (S3)
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Here, )(, itjiQ and itH represent the worker-firm spell fixed effects and the idiosyncratic error
terms. The vector X contains the same control variables as in equation (8). Altogether, 1Z and
2Z comprise four identifying instrumental variables that are excluded from the primary equation
(8). For instrumental variables to be valid, they must be relevant, i.e., significant predictors of the
working time arrangements in the first stage, and exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with the
idiosyncratic error term itu in equation (8).
Our first three exclusion restrictions, included in 1Z , follow a standard procedure of IV
estimations with panel data (e.g., Fernandez-Val and Vella, 2011; Vella and Verbeek, 1998).
Specifically, we instrument each of the working hours arrangements with its corresponding
lagged variable, i.e., itSM is instrumented by 2itSM , itED is instrumented by 2itED , and
itFT is instrumented by 2itFT . These instruments are relevant, because a worker’s past choices
are likely to affect his current choice. At first glance, it appears natural that the experience of
previous work under a certain working time regime increases the likelihood of future work under
that regime; therefore, we would expect positive coefficients 1jZ , ( 3,2,1 j ), on the
corresponding lagged working time regime variables. Note, however, that in a fixed effects
within-estimation also negative coefficients on the lagged working time regime variables can
occur if changes between regimes occur relatively frequent and the observation period is
relatively short. As our panel is relatively short and changes between working time regimes may
be caused by a number of events such as employer changes, promotions, relocations or
management policy changes, negative signs of the coefficients on the lagged variables would not
be surprising. With respect to the exogeneity requirement, we have to assume that a worker’s
working time regime in the past (lagged by two periods) has no direct effect on a worker’s
current work effort; i.e., that it is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error itu in equation (8). In
our application, this assumption seems credible, the more so as it only needs to hold conditional
on our large set of covariates, which includes the contemporary working time regime, a large set
of observed characteristics, and the worker’s unobserved time-constant propensity to provide
extra effort while employed at a particular firm (the worker-firm spell fixed effect). After
holding all these factors constant, it is hard to see how the lagged working time regime could
have a direct effect on the worker’s current effort.
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As a further instrument for our focus variable, itSM , 2Z represents the share of workers
with SMWT among all workers in the same occupational status group, firm size category, sector,
and region.31 This group-specific mean is positively correlated with the SMWT dummy SM by
construction and should consequently be negatively correlated with the remaining working hours
arrangement dummies ED and FT . On the other hand, there is no reason to expect that the
average demand for SMWT employees within each of these cells has an influence on an
employee’s propensity to provide extra effort in any other way than through its effect on the
individual choice of SMWT.32 This should especially hold true, because we group the
observations mainly according to firm characteristics rather than employee characteristics.
In our first approach, we estimate the parameters of the triangular four-equation structure
(8), (S1)-(S3) by the two-stage least squares (2SLS) within estimator, where at the second stage
SM , ED and FT in the primary equation (8) are replaced by their predicted values. We refer
to this estimator as the fixed effects instrumental variables estimator (FEIV). Since the model
(8), (S1)-(S3) is overidentified with four instruments for three endogenous explanatory variables,
we can test the exogeneity of the overidentifying restrictions, conditional on the validity of at
least as many instruments as are required for exact identification.
The 2SLS approach has the strength that it allows the inclusion of fixed effects, because the
first stages are estimated as linear probability models. It has the drawback, however, that the
binary nature of the endogenous regressors is not explicitly accounted for. We therefore
implement a second IV approach to address this issue by estimating the first-stage equations
(S1)-(S3) as probit models. Since the fixed effects probit model leads to inconsistent parameter
estimates (e.g., Baltagi, 2008), we estimate random effects probit models, but proxy for time-
constant firm-specific unobserved worker heterogeneity that may be correlated with the error
term by additionally including the person-firm mean values of all the time-varying covariates of
(S1), (S2), and (S3), respectively. This proceeding is also known as Mundlak’s approach (e.g.,
Greene, 2008). The first-stage equations (S1)-(S3) can then be written as
31 There are 12 groups of occupational status (6 hierarchies within blue-collar jobs, and 6 hierarchies within white-
collar jobs), four firm size classes, 10 industries and the 16 federal states of Germany. Cells with just one
observation do not provide real means and are therefore merged. By proceeding in this way, we prevent the
instrument for these observations being identical to the endogenous SMWT variable and thus avoid potential
endogeneity of the instrument.
32 The idea to use group-specific means as exclusion restrictions is not unusual and has been applied, for example, in
Woessmann and West (2006).
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where D represents SM , ED or FT , respectively. Here,
*
itD denotes the latent propensity to
choose working time regime itD , and
D
itH is a normally distributed error term. The vector DW
includes each of the right-hand-side variables of equations (S1), (S2), and (S3), while
D
itjiW )(,
contains the person-firm mean values of all time-varying covariates of (S1), (S2), and (S3).
Finally, D itji )(,T is that part of the original unobserved effect D itji )(,Q which remains after
controlling for the person-firm means of the time-varying covariates, i.e.,
DD
itji
D
itji
D
itji W 2)(,)(,)(, KQT  . Mundlak’s approach relies on the assumption that after controlling
for the person-firm mean values, D itji )(,T is uncorrelated with the original regressors in DW and
can hence be treated as a random effect.
From the random effects probit estimates of (S4) and (S5), we extract the generalised
residuals    > @itititititDit Ds ))) 1I , where itI and it) denote the PDF and CDF of the
standard normal distribution evaluated at
D
itji
DD
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it WW )(,2)(,1 TKK  . In the second stage, these
generalised residuals are added as correction terms to equation (8) in order to control for
remaining time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, i.e.,
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Intuitively, the generalised residuals embody time-varying characteristics that drive the
selection into the working time regimes, and explicitly controlling for them in the second stage
removes the endogeneity bias from the coefficients of the working time regime variables. Just as
for equation (8), equation (S6) is estimated by the fixed effects estimator.33 We refer to this
second approach as the endogeneity-corrected fixed effects estimator (ECFE).
33 See Fernandez-Val and Vella (2011) for a similar two-step estimation strategy.
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The coefficients resulting from our FEIV estimation of equations (8), (S1)-(S3) and our
ECFE estimator according to (S6) can be found in Table S1. It can be asserted that the parameter
estimates are in line with our FE estimates. According to both the FEIV and the ECFE model the
point estimate is approximately 1.5 hours (statistically significant at the 1% level).
Table S1: Effects of self-managed working time on employee extra effort
Estimation strategy FEIV ECFE
(1) (2)
Self-managed working time ( SM ) 1.587*** (0.514) 1.557*** (0.310)
Employer-determined working time ( ED ) 0.527 (0.577) 0.896*** (0.241)
Flexitime ( FT ) 1.399* (0.722) 0.560** (0.244)
Correction term SMs -0.405 (0.333)
Correction term EDs -0.173 (0.170)
Correction term FTs 0.130 (0.197)
Endogeneity test ( p -value) 0.659 0.258
Test on instrument relevance (test statistic)
SM equation
ED equation
FT equation
610.3***
105.8***
133.9***
424.6***
305.0***
373.1***
Hansen J -test ( p -value) 0.366
2
R -within 0.019 0.130
N 19,832 19,495
Note: * 1.0p ; ** 05.0p ; *** 01.0p . The dependent variable is WH' . The values in parentheses represent
robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. The endogeneity test for the FEIV model is a C -test, while
the endogeneity test for the ECFE model is an F -test on 0321    WWW in (S6). Analogously, the test on
instrument relevance for the FEIV (ECFE) model is an F -test ( 2F -test). The Hansen J -test is a test on
overidentifying exclusion restrictions. The specifications contain a set of covariates described in Table S5. The
specifications also include occupation dummies, industry dummies, time dummies, and worker-firm spell fixed
effects.
Table S1 also includes information about the validity of the exclusion restrictions applied in
the FEIV and the ECFE approach. First, relevance of the instruments is indicated by F - or 2F -
tests on joint significance in the respective first-stage regressions. Each of the test statistics by far
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exceeds the rule-of-thumb value of 10, indicating strong instruments. Instrument relevance is
additionally confirmed by the corresponding parameter estimates of the first-stage equations,
which are displayed in Table S2. In each of the first-stage equations both the respective lagged
working time variable and the group-specific mean variable are significant at the 5% or 1% level,
respectively. The group-specific mean variable exhibits the expected positive sign in the SM
equations and a likewise unsurprising negative sign in the ED and FT equations. Moreover, all
lagged working time variables exhibit a negative sign in the corresponding reduced form
equation. Finally, Hansen’s J -test documents that the overidentification restrictions can be
considered as exogenous ( 366.0 p ).34 All in all, therefore, the diagnostic tests support the
validity of the overidentifying restrictions and thus emphasise the confidence in our FEIV and
ECFE approaches.
Note, however, that neither the C -test for endogeneity nor an F -test on joint significance of
the endogeneity correction terms SMs , EDs and FTs in equation (S6), i.e., 0321    WWW ,
rejects the null hypothesis of exogenous working time arrangement dummies ( 659.0 p or
258.0 p , respectively). This indicates that the FE estimates displayed in Table 3 can already be
interpreted as causal, and that there is no necessity to additionally account for unobserved time-
varying heterogeneity. As a result, the FE, FEIV and ECFE models all provide consistent
estimates for the SMWT effect, where the FE model is the most efficient of the three models,
producing the smallest standard errors. Therefore, the FE model is our preferred model, but its
results are confirmed by the FEIV and ECFE models.35
34 We conducted additional tests with regard to the exogeneity assumption of our exclusion restrictions. Specifically,
we ran FEIV regressions, where only three of the four instrumental variables served as exclusion restrictions, while
the remaining instrument was added to the vector of control variables in the primary equation. A simple t -test on
significance of the estimated coefficient then provides information in terms of the exogeneity assumption of this
particular instrument. Each of our instruments proved to be insignificant in the primary equation which is consistent
with the result of Hansen’s J -test of overidentification. Furthermore, we simply added the instruments to equation
(8) in order to test the exogeneity assumption. Neither of the instruments turned out to be significant in this
specification.
35 Another way to verify that the FEIV and ECFE models confirm the estimates of the FE model is to note that its
SMWT effect of 1.346 hours lies within the 95% confidence intervals for the SMWT effect resulting from the FEIV
and ECFE models.
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Table S2: First-stage estimates of the exclusion restrictions according to (S1)-(S3)
Estimation strategy FEIV ECFE
Explanatory variable to
be instrumented
SM ED FT SM ED FT
2tSM -0.163***(0.014)
-0.002
(0.015)
-0.010
(0.016)
-1.192***
(0.188)
0.149
(0.108)
-0.084
(0.134)
2tED 0.003(0.005)
-0.231***
(0.013)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.263
(0.193)
-0.940***
(0.068)
0.091
(0.116)
2tFT -0.013(0.008)
0.005
(0.012)
-0.182***
(0.015)
0.081
(0.204)
0.050
(0.106)
-0.968***
(0.107)
Group-specific mean
for employees with
SMWT
0.707***
(0.016)
-0.142***
(0.017)
-0.340***
(0.020)
5.065***
(0.265)
-1.514***
(0.165)
-2.501***
(0.155)
Note: * 1.0p ; ** 05.0p ; *** 01.0p . The values in parentheses represent robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level. The same sets of control variables as in Table S1 are included, but not reported to save space.
S2. Correlation matrix and additional estimation results
Table S3: Correlation matrix
WH' SM ED FT FWT IM R PE AUTONO
WH' 1
SM 0.239* 1
ED 0.056* -0.183* 1
FT 0.021* -0.185* -0.278* 1
FWT -0.213* -0.320* -0.481* -0.486* 1
IM 0.060* 0.038* 0.026* -0.057* 0.003 1
R 0.038* 0.005 0.031* -0.037* 0.001 0.009 1
PE 0.081* 0.029* -0.056* 0.224* -0.16* -0.015* -0.005 1
AUTONO 0.267* 0.234* -0.124* 0.291* -0.285* -0.081* -0.011* 0.177* 1
Note: * 05.0p . FWT indicates the fixed working time regime. All other variable names are introduced in the
paper (see also Table S5 for a description of the variables).
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Table S4: OLS and FE estimates for the complete model specifications of Table 3
Estimation strategy OLS FE
(2) (4)
Self-managed working time ( SM ) 3.308*** (0.177) 1.346*** (0.179)
Employer-determined working time ( ED ) 1.407*** (0.093) 0.758*** (0.110)
Flexitime ( FT ) 0.732*** (0.093) 0.602*** (0.118)
Low / medium job autonomy 0.309** (0.139) 0.139 (0.207)
Medium job autonomy 0.705*** (0.154) 0.523** (0.232)
Medium / high job autonomy 1.845*** (0.202) 1.039*** (0.272)
High job autonomy 3.501*** (0.470) 1.282*** (0.463)
Monthly gross wage 0.728*** (0.052) 0.361*** (0.082)
Job satisfaction -0.074*** (0.019) -0.071*** (0.022)
Satisfaction with household income -0.078*** (0.019) 0.006 (0.026)
Living with partner -0.002 (0.098) -0.272** (0.134)
Children aged under 16 -0.402*** (0.080) -0.296*** (0.109)
Full-time employed 0.201* (0.117) -0.180 (0.177)
Fixed-term contract 0.046 (0.138) -0.180 (0.203)
Employer change -0.012 (0.132) 0.117 (0.216)
Male 0.785*** (0.117)
Foreign nationality -0.253* (0.141)
Job tenure -0.065*** (0.014) -0.025 (0.047)
Job tenure squared / 100 0.092** (0.037) 0.054 (0.070)
Schooling -0.061*** (0.023)
Full-time experience -0.020 (0.013) 0.200* (0.103)
Full-time experience squared / 100 -0.008 (0.033) -0.130* (0.075)
Part-time experience -0.030 (0.018) 0.197* (0.105)
Part-time experience squared / 100 0.095 (0.069) 0.074 (0.151)
Unemployment experience -0.006 (0.046) 0.440 (0.446)
Unemployment experience squared / 100 -0.231 (0.314) -2.193 (3.738)
Hobbies and other leisure activities -0.273*** (0.024) -0.129*** (0.031)
Satisfaction with health 0.016 (0.024) 0.072*** (0.027)
Current health: good -0.019 (0.118) 0.155 (0.123)
Current health: satisfactory 0.245 (0.141) 0.412*** (0.148)
Current health: poor 0.564*** (0.186) 0.574*** (0.190)
Current health: bad 0.251 (0.318) 0.361 (0.355)
Strong worries about job security -0.056 (0.104) -0.061 (0.119)
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Estimation strategy OLS FE
(2) (4)
Some worries about job security -0.195*** (0.072) -0.032 (0.074)
Regional unemployment rate 0.071*** (0.010) -0.015 (0.029)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Firm size dummies Yes No
Time dummies Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes
Firm spell fixed effects No Yes
2
R /
2
R -within 0.305 0.102
N 30,699 31,522
Note: * 1.0p ; ** 05.0p ; *** 01.0p . The dependent variable is WH' . The values in parentheses represent
robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. The reference group for the working time regimes is ‘fixed
working time’ (FWT). The reference group for the job autonomy dummies is ‘low autonomy’. The reference group
for the dummies representing current health is ‘very good’. The reference group for the dummies representing
worries about job security is ‘no worries’. Number of industry dummies: 9/10. Number of firm size dummies: 3/4.
Number of time dummies: 4/5. Number of occupation dummies: 1288/1289. Number of worker-firm spell fixed
effects: 14,321.
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S3. Description of the variables
Table S5: Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable Definition N Mean Std Min-Max
Dependent variable
WH' Difference between average actual and contractual
working time per week
38,312 3.68 5.44 -38-42
Main explanatory variables
Self-managed
working time
( SM )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
has extensive decision-making authority in terms of
scheduling individual working hours (reference group:
fixed working time)
38,312 0.11 0.31 0-1
Employer-
determined
working time
( ED )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
faces flexible working hours determined by the
employer (reference group: fixed working time)
38,312 0.22 0.41 0-1
Flexitime within a
working hours
account ( FT )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
is allowed to vary daily working hours, where daily
attendance is restricted to a defined time interval
(working hours account) (reference group: fixed
working time)
38,312 0.22 0.41 0-1
Positive
reciprocity ( R )
See footnote 18 34,877 0.41 0.49 0-1
Intrinsic
motivation ( IM )
Dummy variable indicating whether an employee’s
desired working time per week ൒ the contractual
working time per week
37,809 0.74 0.44 0.1
Performance
evaluation ( PE )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee’s performance is regularly evaluated by a
supervisor
33,645 0.31 0.46 0-1
Performance
evaluation
without
consequences
( 1PE )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee’s performance is regularly evaluated by a
supervisor without involving consequences for monthly
gross salary, yearly bonus payments, future salary
increases, or potential promotions
33,645 0.11 0.31 0-1
Performance
evaluation with
consequences
( 2PE )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee’s performance is regularly evaluated by a
supervisor with consequences for monthly gross salary,
yearly bonus payments, future salary increases, or
potential promotions
33,645 0.2 0.4 0-1
Control variables
Low job
autonomy
Dummy variable indicating mainly manual workers
with a low level of status and a low level of autonomy
38,312 0.16 0.36 0-1
Low / medium job
autonomy
Dummy variable indicating workers in production and
services demanding a minimal level of specialization,
and farm workers.
38,312 0.3 0.46 0-1
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Variable Definition N Mean Std Min-Max
Medium job
autonomy
Dummy variable indicating jobs that require completion
of the middle track of secondary education and entail a
limited amount of responsibility
38,312 0.33 0.47 0-1
Medium / high
job autonomy
Dummy variable indicating jobs carried out either with
or without supervision that require a degree from a
college of applied sciences or university, but are not
very high in prestige
38,312 0.19 0.4 0-1
High job
autonomy
Dummy variable indicating managers and freelance
academics
38,312 0.02 0.13 0-1
Monthly gross
wage
Gross wage of the employee in the month before the
survey (in 1,000 Euros)
38,312 2.42 1.6 0.40-30.0
Job satisfaction Ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10, indicating an
employee’s job satisfaction (0: completely unsatisfied,
10: completely satisfied)
37,822 6.95 1.99 0-10
Satisfaction with
household income
Ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10, indicating an
employee’s satisfaction with household income (0:
completely unsatisfied, 10: completely satisfied)
38,000 6.4 2.09 0-10
Living with
partner
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
has a settled living partner
38,116 0.84 0.36 0-1
Children aged
under 16
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
has one or more children aged under 16 who currently
live in the household
38,276 0.36 0.48 0-1
Full-time
employed
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
is employed full-time
36,133 0.77 0.42 0-1
Fixed-term
contract
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
has a fixed-term contract
36,827 0.09 0.29 0-1
Employer change Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
realised an employer change in the year before the
survey
38,312 0.08 0.27 0-1
Male Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
is male
38,312 0.5 0.5 0-1
Foreign
nationality
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
is of non-German nationality
38,312 0.07 0.26 0-1
Job tenure Years of an employee’s job tenure 38,267 10.75 9.65 0-50.9
Schooling Years of schooling an employee has had 37,278 12.39 2.53 7-18
Full-time
experience
Years of an employee’s experience in a full-time job 37,972 15.82 11.26 0-49
Part-time
experience
Years of an employee’s experience in a part-time job 37,972 2.93 5.45 0-45
Unemployment
experience
Years of a worker’s unemployment experience 37,972 0.61 1.55 0-24.1
Hobbies and other
leisure activities
Number of hours devoted to hobbies and other leisure
activities on a typical working day
37,104 1.59 1.36 0-15
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Variable Definition N Mean Std Min-Max
Satisfaction with
health
Ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10 that indicates the
degree of satisfaction with an employee’s health (0:
completely unsatisfied, 10: completely satisfied)
38,246 6.92 1.98 0-10
Current health:
good
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
assesses his current health status as good (reference
group: very good)
38,254 0.48 0.5 0-1
Current health:
satisfactory
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
assesses his current health status as satisfactory
(reference group: very good)
38,254 0.32 0.47 0-1
Current health:
poor
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
assesses his current health status as poor (reference
group: very good)
38,254 0.1 0.3 0-1
Current health:
bad
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
assesses his current health status as bad (reference
group: very good)
38,254 0.01 0.11 0-1
Strong worries
about job security
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
is strongly concerned about his job security (reference
group: no worries)
37,435 0.16 0.37 0-1
Some worries
about job security
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
is somewhat concerned about his job security (reference
group: no worries)
37,435 0.44 0.5 0-1
Firm size 20-200 Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
works in a firm that employs between 20 and 200
employees (reference group: < 20)
37,259 0.3 0.46 0-1
Firm size 201-
2000
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
works in a firm that employs between 201 and 2000
employees (reference group: < 20)
37,259 0.23 0.42 0-1
Firm size >2000 Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
works in a firm that employs more than 2000 employees
(reference group: < 20)
37,259 0.23 0.42 0-1
Regional
unemployment
rate
Average unemployment rate of the German federal
state, where the employee lives (%)
38,276 10.8 4.51 4.3-22.1
Alternative measures of extra work
Overtime last
month
Number of overtime hours an employee has executed in
the recent month before the survey
37,467 2.26 3.55 0-22.8
2WH' Difference between the number of working hours in a
typical week (including commuting times as well as
working hours devoted to a potential second job, as well
as work at Saturdays and Sundays) and the weekly
contractual working hours
35,541 10.48 9.42 -59.5-108
Alternative productivity measures
Absenteeism Number of annual days absent from work due to illness 32,096 8.41 21.95 0-365
Worries about job
security
Ordinal variable ranging between 1 and 3 indicating
strong / some / no worries about job security
37,435 2.23 0.71 1-3
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Variable Definition N Mean Std Min-Max
Hourly wage Gross monthly wage of the employee divided by actual
monthly working hours (in Euros)
38,312 14.63 8.83 1.5- 263.7
Task efficiency Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
approves to the statement: “I see myself as someone who
does things effectively and efficiently” (original variable
is ordinal ranging between 1: does not apply to me at all
and 7: applies to me perfectly; threshold: 6)
15,522 0.73 0.45 0-1
Non-standard working hours
Work in the
evening
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
at least occasionally works in the evening
29,241 0.51 0.5 0-1
Work at night Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
at least occasionally works at night
28,188 0.26 0.44 0-1
Work on Saturday Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
at least occasionally works on Saturdays
29,364 0.6 0.49 0-1
Work on Sunday Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
at least occasionally works on Sundays
28,263 0.34 0.47 0-1
Indicators related to intrinsic motivation
Job satisfaction Ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10, indicating an
employee’s job satisfaction (0: completely unsatisfied,
10: completely satisfied)
56,339 6.97 1.95 0-10
Sacrifice Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
approves to the statement: “Those closest to me say I
sacrifice myself too much for my job” (original variable
is ordinal ranging between 1: strongly disagree and 4:
strongly agree; threshold: 3)
12,109 0.4 0.49 0-1
Unpaid overtime Percentage of unpaid overtime work in the month before
the survey
30,339 0.2 0.39 0-1
Hard-working Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
approves to the statement: “I see myself as someone who
tends to be lazy” (reversed; original variable is ordinal
ranging between 1: does not apply to me at all and 7:
applies to me perfectly; threshold: 2)
12,425 0.89 0.31 0-1
Thorough Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
approves to the statement: “I see myself as someone who
does a thorough job” (original variable is ordinal
ranging between 1: does not apply to me at all and 7:
applies to me perfectly; threshold: 6)
12,444 0.86 0.35 0-1
Task efficiency Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
approves to the statement: “I see myself as someone who
does things effectively and efficiently” (original variable
is ordinal ranging between 1: does not apply to me at all
and 7: applies to me perfectly; threshold: 6)
12,433 0.73 0.44 0-1
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Variable Definition N Mean Std Min-Max
Joy at work Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
approves to the statement: “I do not really enjoy my
work” (original variable is ordinal ranging between 1:
applies to me perfectly and 4: does not apply to me at
all; threshold: 3)
6,072 0.84 0.37 0-1
Work load indicators
Work strain Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
approves to the statement: “The amount of work has
increased steadily over the last two years”
12,073 0.65 0.48 0-1
Time pressure Dummy variable indicating whether or not an employee
approves to the statement : “Because of the high volume
of work there is often high time pressure”
12,139 0.64 0.48 0-1
Indicators for extrinsic motivation
Paid overtime Percentage of paid overtime work in the month before
the survey
30,339 0.8 0.39 0-1
Expected
promotion
Self-reported probability of receiving a promotion at the
current place of employment
25,764 0.29 0.45 0-1
Expected pay rise Self-reported probability of receiving an individual pay
rise that goes beyond the collectively negotiated pay
rate increase
25,761 0.26 0.44 0-1
Exclusion restrictions
2tSM Two years lagged observations of SM 23,192 0.11 0.31 0-1
2tED Two years lagged observations of ED 23,192 0.21 0.41 0-1
2tFT Two years lagged observations of FT 23,192 0.23 0.42 0-1
Group-specific
mean for
employees with
SMWT
Average share of SM in groups separated by 2
occupational status classes, 4 firm size classes, 10
industry classes, 16 regional classes, and 5 time periods
36,480 0.12 0.25 0-1
Note: N is the number of observations. Std is standard deviation. In order to save space the information for 1289
occupation dummies, 10 industry dummies, and five time dummies are not displayed.
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